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Statutory interpretation is governed by a single, fundamental rule: 
“when the statute is clear, apply it.”1  But this rule has not always been 
followed.  Writing in 1997, the late Justice Antonin Scalia could find few 
extant treatises, and no law schools teaching courses, on statutory 
interpretation.2  Yet a strong history of statutory interpretation existed 
within American jurisprudence.  In 1958, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks’s 
 
*Associate Attorney at Dunlap & Seeger, P.A., Adjunct Professor at Mitchell Hamline 
School of Law. 1Frank H. Easterbrook,	 Text,	 History,	 and	 Structure	 in	 Statutory	
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994). 
	 2	 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14-15 
(Amy Gutman ed. Princeton University Press New Edition 2018) (1997). 
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seminal work The	Legal	Process first appeared, offering an academically 
acceptable rule for interpretation: 
 
The function of a court in interpreting a statute is to decide 
what meaning ought to be given to the directions of the statute 
in the respects relevant to the case before it…[This] does not 
say that the court’s function is to ascertain the intention of the 
legislature with respect to the matter in issue.3 
 
This idea, along with decisions in subsequent case law, has been 
seen as heralding the arrival of statutory interpretation.4  
Early Supreme Court jurisprudence offered a focus on legislative 
“intent” as the primary means of statutory interpretation.5  In the 
1980’s, a formalist view of statutory interpretation began to appear, 
shepherded by intellectual heavyweights such as Justice Scalia and 
Judge Frank Easterbrook.6  This view, referred to as textualism, is equal 
parts philosophy and practice; it is based on the proposition that “judges 
must seek and abide by the public meaning of the enacted text, 
understood in context.”7  Perhaps because its chief proponents sit on the 
bench rather than in the classroom, textualism has seeped into our case 
law from the United States Supreme Court on down.8  
Because of the emphasis jurists such as Scalia, Easterbrook, and 
others, placed on textualism, it has gained a reputation as a politically 
conservative method of legal interpretation.9  Political Conservatives 
often cite a judge’s tendency to adhere to a textualist approach as an 
important criteria for picking federal judges.10  Finally, politicians 
 
 3 The Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Intent,	Clear	Statements,	and	the	Common	Law:	Statutory	
Interpretation	in	the	Supreme	Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892, 892-93 (1982). 
	 4	 See id. at 893-94. 
	 5	 See, e.g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (“Our objective in a case 
such as this is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative 
will.”); U.S. v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the interpretation of 
statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to 
give effect to the intent of Congress.”). 
 6 John F. Manning, Textualism	and	Legislative	Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005).  
	 7	 Id.	at 420. 
	 8	 See, e.g., W. Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (“As we have 
observed before, however, the purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out to 
change, but also what it resolves to leave alone….  The best evidence of that purpose is 
the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President.”); 
Guzman v. Denny’s Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 930, 934 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (“All questions of 
statutory construction must start with the plain language of the text itself.”). 
	 9	 See Infra Part III. 
	 10	 See, e.g., Elizabeth Dias & Adam Liptak, To	 Conservatives,	 Barrett	Has	 ‘Perfect	
Combination’	 of	 Attributes	 for	 Supreme	 Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2020), 
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describing their ideal jurist often pair textualism with originalism, 
furthering the notion that textualism is a politically conservative 
exegetical tool.11 
This Article argues that textualism is not merely a vehicle for 
Conservative judges to push an agenda, but rather a powerful tool in the 
progressive toolbox.  Section II  discusses some of the foundational ideas 
of textualism, including the use and meaning of words and how these 
ideas translate to statutory interpretation.  Section III examines 
textualism’s reputation as a conservative doctrine of statutory 
interpretation and argues that this reputation is a function of its 
application by Conservative judges rather than an inherent trait of 
textualism.  Finally, Section IV argues that textualism has played an 
important role in court decisions that would be considered 
“progressive” and then contemplates certain scenarios in which a purely 




A. TEXTUALISM  
So what is textualism and why does it matter?  There are many 
types of textualism, yet all share the same foundational premise that 
“the text of the law is the law.”12  One way to view textualism is as an 
ideological rejection of the judicial excesses of “legislative intent.” 
i. Legislative	intent	
“Legislative intent” has roots beyond American jurisprudence.  
Justice Scalia traces the notion at least as far back as William 
Blackstone.13  Evidence suggests that even older precedent exists in 
English law, with one Supreme Court case quoting Edward Coke: “Acts 
of parliament are to be so construed as no man that is innocent or free 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/20/us/politics/supreme-court-barrett.html; 
Veronica Stracqualursi & Jim Acosta, Trump	on	Supreme	Court	Nominee:	 ‘It	will	be	a	
woman’, CNN (Sept. 19, 2020, 8:31 PM) 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/19/politics/trump-ruth-bader-ginsburg-vacant-seat-
fill/index.html. 	
	 11	 See Dias, supra note 10.  
 12 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing	Statutory	Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118 
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
 13 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 16 (citing SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England 59-62, 91 (1765)). 
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from injury or wrong be, by a literal construction, punished or 
endangered.”14 
The high-water mark for legislative intent is the case of Church	of	
the	Holy	Trinity	v.	United	States.15  This case involved a church in New 
York City contracting with an Englishman to come to the United States 
and serve as its rector, all in violation of a statute making it “unlawful 
for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any manner 
whatsoever . . .  or in any way assist or encourage the importation or 
migration, of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the 
United State . . .  under contract or agreement . . . to perform labor or 
service of any kind in the United States.”16  
It seems obvious that the acts of Holy Trinity Church clearly fall 
within the statute, yet the Court disagreed.17  In a central part of the 
Court’s ruling, Justice Brewer stated: 
 
It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within 
the letter of this section, for the relation of rector to his church 
is one of service, and implies labor on the one side with 
compensation on the other.  Not only are the general words 
‘labor’ and ‘service’ both used, but also, as it were to guard 
against any narrow interpretation and emphasize a breadth of 
meaning, to them is added ‘of any kind;’ and, further, as 
noticed by the circuit judge in his opinion, the fifth section, 
which makes specific exceptions, among them professional 
actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic servants, 
strengthens the idea that every other kind of labor and service 
was intended to be reached by the first section.  While there is 
great force to this reasoning, we cannot think congress 
intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in 
the present case.  It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within 
the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because 
not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.18 
 
This passage encapsulates the Court’s placing of “intent” above the 
law itself.  Still good law, Holy	 Trinity closed with a wholesale 
endorsement of departure from statutory text: 
 
 
 14 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
 15 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
	 16	 Id. at 457-58. 
	 17	 Id. at 458-59. 
	 18	 Id.	 
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The construction invoked cannot be accepted as correct.  It is 
a case where there was presented a definite evil, in view of 
which the legislature used general terms with the purpose of 
reaching all phases of that evil; and thereafter, unexpectedly, 
it is developed that the general language thus employed is 
broad enough to reach cases and acts which the whole history 
and life of the country affirm could not have been intentionally 
legislated against.  It is the duty of the courts, under those 
circumstances, to say that, however broad the language of the 
statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not within 
the intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within 
the statute.19 
 
The lasting effect of Holy	Trinity, Justice Scalia wrote, is that “Church	of	
the	Holy	Trinity is cited to us whenever counsel wants us to ignore the 
narrow, deadening text of the statute, and pay attention to the life-giving 
legislative intent.  It is nothing but an invitation to judicial lawmaking.”20 
The chief criticisms of legislative intent are related and share one 
common factor: Congress.  First, as Scalia suggests, relying on legislative 
intent opens the door to judicial lawmaking and encourages the court to 
usurp the law-making function of Congress.  Separation of powers is a 
fundamental part of our system of government.  “In this system what 
counts as law is texts enacted by two branches of the legislature and 
signed by the President (or enacted by supermajority over his veto), and 
these laws are effective on the date of their enactment until their 
repeal.”21  Bicameralism and presentment are two principles that form 
a bedrock of the democratic process in which the peoples’ elected 
representatives draft legislation, and their elected leader signs that 
legislation into law.  Legislative intent, on the other hand, invites 
unelected, unaccountable judges to legislate from the bench as they see 
fit. 
The second criticism of legislative intent relates to the idea of 
Congress having any single, discernable intent in the first place.  As 
Justice Scalia wrote, “the quest for the ‘genuine’ legislative intent is 
probably a wild-goose chase.”22  Congress has two branches, the House 
 
	 19	 Id. at 472. 
 20 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 21. 
 21 Frank Easterbrook, Textualism	and	 the	Dead	Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 
1119 (1998); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.”). 
 22 Antonin Scalia, Judicial	Deference	to	Administrative	Interpretations	of	Law, 1989 
DUKE L. J. 511, 517 (1989). 
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of Representatives and the Senate, which together consist of 535 
members.  Each member has their own interests and motivations, 
making the existence of a collective intent to pass a piece of litigation 
impossible.23  Furthermore, the idea of legislative intent requires an 
inquirer to set aside reason and ignore the influence of interest groups,24 
while also turning a blind eye to the reality that many legislators do not 
read every bill on which they vote.25  One need merely tune in to CSPAN 
to be disabused of the notion of legislative intent. 
ii. Textualism	
If legislative intent is unreliable, there must be some other means 
of interpreting the meaning of a statute.  Determining the proper 
method of statutory interpretation depends on the goals of the 
interpreter.  Textualism, as Judge Easterbrook defines it, has five goals: 
(1) to give understandable commands; (2) to confine judges; (3) to 
empower Congress; (4) to constrain Congress; and (5) to improve the 
substance of rules.26 
A legal system should give understandable commands that can be 
consistently interpreted.27  This requires simplicity.  A system of laws 
that courts can consistently interpret confines judges in the sense that 
it produces predictable results and honors the democratic system of 
legislation.28  This, in turn, empowers Congress by letting it alone make 
the rules.29  At the same time, the system constrains Congress through 
 
	 23	 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Some	Tasks	in	Understanding	Law	Through	the	Lens	
of	Public	Choice, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 284 (1992) (“[T]he concept of ‘an’ intent for 
a person is fictive and for an institution hilarious.  A hunt for this snipe liberates the 
interpreter, who can attribute to the drafters whatever ‘intent’ serves purposes derived 
by other means.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’	Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 
(1983) (“Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or 
‘designs,’ hidden yet discoverable.”). 
	 24	 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The	 Independent	 Judiciary	 in	 an	
Interest	Group	Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975) (arguing that interest groups 
“purchase” legislation using “campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future 
favors, and sometimes outright bribes.”). 
 25 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 32 (“In earlier days, when Congress had a smaller staff and 
enacted less legislation, it might have been possible to believe that a significant number 
of senators or representatives were present for the floor debate, or read the committee 
reports, and actually voted on the basis of what they heard or read.  Those days, if they 
ever existed, are long gone.”). 
 26 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 63-64. 
 27 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 63. 
 28 Easterbrook, supra note 1,	at 63 (“ [Judges] are supposed to be faithful agents, not 
independent principals.  Having a wide field to play—not only the statute but also the 
debates, not only the rules but also the values they advance, and so on—liberates 
judges.”). 
 29 Easterbrook, supra note 1,	at 63 
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the requirements of bicameralism, presentment, and publication of the 
laws, all of which drag law making out into the public view.30  
Improving the substance of the law—one  goal of textualism—is 
somewhat at odds with the other goals of textualism stated by Judge 
Easterbrook.  Improving the substance of laws “can be accomplished 
only by the strategy of defining ends and seeking them, a strategy that 
costs us dearly in ability to achieve the principal objectives.”31  
Generally, however, substance is within the realm of the legislature.32 
On a theoretical level, textualism rejects legislative history and 
intent while labeling both  “an unreliable proxy for the intentions of a 
whole legislative body.”33  Instead, textualism seeks a method of 
interpretation that supplies simple rules that facilitate consistent 
outcomes, while stifling judicial activism.  At its core, textualism is about 
predicable results emanating from democratically created statutes. 
B. WORDS AND THEIR MEANINGS 
Setting theory aside, what does textualism mean in a practical 
sense?  First, it should be stated that textualism in not necessarily 
“literalism.”  Neither is it strict-constructionism, which Justice Scalia 
describes as “a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole 
philosophy into disrepute.”34  Similarly, some argue that the concept of 
the “plain meaning” of words holds no sway in a textualist analysis.35  
And yet, words are at the very heart of a textualist approach to statutory 
interpretation. 
The philosophy of language, especially the work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, holds that words possess no intrinsic meanings, nor can 
intrinsic meanings be given to words.36  In fact, Wittgenstein states that 
speakers do not even have determinative intents about the meanings of 
their own words.37  So if words have no intrinsic meanings, and speakers 
 
 30 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 63-64. 
 31 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 64. 
 32 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 64. 
 33 Eliot T. Tracz, Discrimination	 and	 the	 Limits	 of	 Textualism, 6 IND. J. L. AND SOC. 
EQUALITY 33, 37 (2018). 
 34 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 23-24. 
 35 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 67 (“‘Plain meaning’ as a way to understand 
language is silly.  In interesting cases, meaning is not “plain”; it must be imputed; and 
the choice among meanings must have a footing more solid that a dictionary—which is 
a museum of words, an historical catalog rather than a means to decode the work of 
legislatures.”). 
 36 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, §§ 138-242 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans.) (1953). 
	 37	 Id.	at 53-56. 
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have no determinative intent as to meaning, from where do words 
derive their meanings?  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing well 
before the advent of textualism, provides a possible answer to this 
question by stating that “we ask, not what this man meant, but what 
those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, 
using them in the circumstances in which they were used.”38 
What Holmes is talking about, and what textualism considers, is 
context.  But consideration of context is not enough to get us to a 
satisfactory system of statutory interpretation.  What do words mean 
within the context of the statute?  The answer to this question depends 
wholly upon the interpretive community seeking to provide an answer.  
When that interpretive community is a court, a new set of questions 
arises: is it a court of general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction, which 
is to ask, are the members of the court generalists or specialists?  Trial 
court judges — both state and federal — tend to be generalists in need 
of a simple and reliable approach to statutory interpretation, whereas 
specialists—for example judges in tax, admiralty, or bankruptcy 
courts—may benefit from more nuanced approaches to 
interpretation.39 
But, back to context.  Assume for the purposes of this Article that 
we have determined our interpretive community to consist of generalist 
judges (and their equally generalist law clerks).  How should a generalist 
judge approach statutory interpretation?  A good place to start is “with 
contextual evidence that goes to customary usage and habits of 
speech.”40  This may include terms of art, or specialized conventions and 
linguistic practices peculiar to law.41  Through these considerations, the 
words of the text derive their meaning and the statute becomes 
accessible for interpretation. 
How does this work in practice?  Consider an enhancement statute 
that aggravates a drug trafficking offense if a gun or silencer is “used” in 
the commission of the offense.  Now consider a scenario where John Doe 
offers to trade his MAC-10 and silencer for two ounces of cocaine during 
an attempted drug transaction.  Is the trade of a gun a “use” within the 
meaning of the statute?  The Supreme Court thought so, finding that the 
pairing of the terms “uses…a firearm” with “during and in relation to” a 
 
 38 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The	Theory	of	Legal	Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 
417-18 (1899). 
 39 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 69-70. 
 40 John F. Manning, What	Divides	Textualists	from	Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 
92 (2006). 
	 41	 Id. at 80-82. 
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drug trafficking crime encompasses a gun-for-drugs trade.42  Context is 
key. 
C. CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION- WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE TEXT IS 
VAGUE? 
So what happens when the language of the text is ambiguous, or the 
application of the text would lead to an absurd or unconstitutional 
outcome?  Most textualists would agree that in these scenarios it 
becomes acceptable to look outside the statute to determine its purpose.  
One widely accepted outside source is legislative history, but this Article 
has already addressed the shortcomings of that approach.  Another 
widely used approach is to use canons of construction. 
Canons of construction are rules particular to the legal community 
that serve as “off-the-rack provisions that spare legislators the costs of 
anticipating all possible interpretive problems and legislating solutions 
for them.”43  Put another way, canons of construction are rules of 
interpretation that the courts use to determine the meaning of statutes.  
Canons of construction have long been linked to textualism.44 
Opinions on canons of construction are mixed.  Karl Llewelyn was 
skeptical about canons, writing that “there are two opposing canons on 
almost every point.”45  He elaborated on this point, creating a list of 
canons arranged into two categories: “thrust” and “parry.”46  Llewellyn 
further argued that “to make any canon take hold in a particular sense, 
the construction must be sold, essentially by means other than the use 
of the canon.”47  
Justice Scalia took issue with Llewellyn’s list, arguing that “if one 
examines the list, it becomes apparent that there really are not two 
opposite canons on ‘almost every point’ — unless one enshrines as a 
canon whatever vapid statement has ever been made by a willful, law 
bending judge.”48  Scalia argued that some of Llewellyn’s “generally 
accepted” canons are not, in fact, generally accepted, such as the canon 
stating: “To effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its 
text.”49  For the most part, however, Scalia mainly argues that 
 
 42 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 232 (1993). 
 43 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’	Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540 (1983). 
 44 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 27. 
 45 Karl Llewellyn, Remarks	 on	 the	 Theory	 of	 Appellate	Decision	 and	 the	 Rules	 or	
Canons	About	How	Statutes	Are	to	Be	Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1949). 
	 46	 Id. 
	 47	 Id. 
 48 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 26. 
 49 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 26. 
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Llewellyn’s “Parry” canons do not actually contradict their opposing 
canon, but “merely show that it is not absolute.”50  
The canons of construction certainly have their issues.  For those 
inclined to favor the use of canons, there are many to choose from.  It 
has been estimated that the U.S. Supreme Court follows as many as 187 
different canons.51  “No canon of interpretation is absolute.  Each may 
be overcome by the strength of differing principles in other 
directions.”52  The superabundance of available canons can lead to 
absurdity even within the confines of a single case.  Consider Babbitt	v.	
Sweet	Home	Chapter	of	Communities	for	a	Great	Oregon.53 
Babbit involved a section of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
(ESA) that made it unlawful for any person to “take any such species 
within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States.”54  The 
ESA defines “take” to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such 
conduct.”55  A Department of the Interior regulation further defined 
“harm” to mean “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.  Such act 
may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it 
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”56 
The respondents in Babbitt were a group of landowners, logging 
companies, and families who brought a declaratory judgment action 
against the Department of the Interior challenging the Department’s 
regulation that added the definition of “harm.”57  Respondents offered 
three arguments: (1) the Senate considered similar language but deleted 
it from the bill; (2) Congress intended the ESA express authorization for 
the Federal Government to buy private land to act as a means to prevent 
habitat degradation as an exclusive check against habitat modification; 
and (3) because the Senate added the term “harm” to the definition of 
“take” in a floor amendment without debate, the court should not 
 
 50 SCALIA, supra note 2, at 26. 
 51 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reading	Law:	The	Interpretation	of	Legal	Texts	by	Antonin	
Scalia	and	Bryan	A.	Garner, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 541 (2013). 
 52 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXT 
59 (2012). 
 53 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Comtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
	 54	 Id.	at 691;16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1)(B). 
 55 16 U.S.C. §1532(19). 
 56 50 C.F.R § 17.3 (2006). 
	 57	 Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 692. 
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interpret the term expansively.58  A District Court judge entered 
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.59  
The Court of Appeals affirmed, but after a rehearing, the panel 
reversed the District Court basing its reasoning on the canon of 
construction called noscitur	a	sociis, which means that a word is known 
by the company it keeps.60  The United State Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals.61  Justice Stevens delivered 
the majority opinion, while Justice Scalia wrote for the dissent.62  The 
result was a battle of the canons, with the Justices invoking over a dozen 
canons of construction between the two of them.63 
Babbitt represents one of the problems with canons of 
construction: with so many cherries, how does one decide which one to 
pick?  There is no canon for selecting canons.  Perhaps it is this 
abundance of canons without any system for selection that led Professor 
Eskridge to describe the selection of canons in Babbitt as “[j]ust as if he 
was picking out friends from the crowd at a cocktail party, each Justice 
picked out friendly canons from the crowd of applicable rules and 
principles.”64 
Professors Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman have 
discovered yet another wrinkle in the use of canons for statutory 
construction.  In a survey of congressional counsel tasked with drafting 
legislation, Gluck and Bressman found that respondents widely consider 
some specific canons such as: 1) the expressio	unius canon (the inclusion 
of specific terms or exceptions indicates an intent to exclude terms or 
exceptions not included), 2) noscitur	a	sociis (construe ambiguous terms 
in a list in reference to other terms in the list), and 3) ejusdem	generis 
(construe general, often catch-all, terms in a list in reference to other, 
more specific, terms in a list).65  Respondents generally rejected other 
 
	 58	 Id. at 693. 
	 59	 Id. at 693-94 
	 60	 Id. at 694. 
	 61	 Id. at 695. 
	 62	 Id. at 690, 714. 
 63 Eskridge, supra note 51, at 547.  Professor Eskridge lists some of the canons relied 
on by each Justice: Justice Stevens: Interpretive direction canon, ordinary meaning for 
definitional term canon, surplusage canon, presumption against ineffectiveness, whole 
text canon.  Justice Scalia: Ordinary meaning canon, canon of imputed common-law 
meaning, associated words canon, presumption against ineffectiveness caveat, rule of 
lenity, whole text canon, whole text canon, presumption of consistent usage, material 
variation canon. 
 64 Eskridge, supra note 51, at 547. 
	 65	 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory	 Interpretation	 from	 the	
Inside—An	Empirical	Study	of	Congressional	Drafting,	Delegation,	and	the	Canons:	Part	I, 
65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 930-33 (2013). 
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canons such as the rule against superfluities and the presumption of 
consistent usage.66  With over 50% responding that dictionaries are 
never or rarely used, the survey showed that the use of dictionaries was 
particularly reviled, one respondent noting Scalia’s specific use of 
dictionaries, saying “Scalia is a bright guy, but no one uses a freaking 
dictionary.”67 
If drafters of legislation often disregard canons, it is natural to 
wonder whether canons are truly helpful to courts interpreting statutes.  
And even if one were to concede that canons are  helpful, there is still a 
need to address how a judge selects the right canon for a statute rather 
than the right canon for the judge’s preferred outcome.  If the goal is 
judicial restraint, then canons of construction seem to undermine rather 
assist this goal.  This concern brings us back to textualism. 
D. SOME CRITICISMS 
Like any theory or system of interpretation, textualism has its 
flaws.  One widely accepted limit of textualism is a case where enforcing 
the unambiguous language of the statute would lead to an absurd 
result.68  An example is §1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act: “Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is declared to be illegal.”69  On its face this is an unambiguous statute, 
yet, in practice, “every contract is a restraint of trade.”70  Clearly it would 
be absurd to find every contract to be a violation of the Sherman Act.  
Another limitation of textualism exists in cases where a textualist 
approach to interpreting the unambiguous text would result in an unjust 
or unconstitutional outcome.  This is particularly true in voting rights 
cases.  In N.C.	State	Conference	of	the	NAACP	v.	McCrory,71 North Carolina 
had enacted a law — Session Law 2013-38172 — that imposed a number 
of voting restrictions including invalidating certain types of ID,73 
reducing early voting from seventeen days to ten days,74 eliminating 
 
	 66	 Id. at 933-37. 
	 67	 Id. at 938.  Gluck and Bressman also note how researchers have found that 
between 2000 and 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court used dictionaries in 225 opinions, while 
in the 1960s, the Court only used dictionaries sixteen times. 
 68 Tracz, supra note 33, at 39. 
 69 15 U.S.C. §1 (2004). 
 70 National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
98 (1984). 
 71 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 72 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381. 
	 73	 Id. § 2.1; McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216. 
	 74	 McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216. 
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same day registration,75 eliminating out of precinct voting,76 and 
eliminating preregistration that would allow sixteen and seventeen year 
olds obtaining driver’s licenses to identify themselves and indicate their 
intent to vote.77 
Session Law 2013-381 was challenged under § 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, which, at the time, read: 
 
No voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any 
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a 
denial abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United 
States to vote on account of race or color….78 
 
On its face, nothing about Session Law 2013-381 seems to violate § 2, 
and in fact the District Court entered judgment against the plaintiffs, 
finding no discrimination or discriminatory intent.79  Looking past the 
text of the law, however, it seems clear that its voting restrictions were 
intended to adversely impact certain classes of voters. Ultimately the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the decision, but this case demonstrates the 





Textualism has a reputation as a “Conservative” doctrine.  It is true 
that textualism has been advocated by Conservatives, both on the bench 
and in academia.  Indeed, a list of jurists who embrace a textualist 
approach to statutory interpretation would read like a Who’s Who of 
Conservative jurists — Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Neil 
Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook — who 
have not only adopted textualism as means of statutory interpretation, 
but have also endorsed textualism in an academic sense.81  
 
	 75	 Id. at 217. 
	 76	 Id. 
	 77	 Id. at 217-18. 
 78 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)). 
	 79	 McCrory, 831 F.3d at 219. 
 80 Tracz, supra note 33, at 42-43. 
	 81	 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 2; NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT (2019); 
Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing	Statutory	Interpretation, Judging	Statutes	129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 
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As a political tool, Conservative politicians have seized onto 
“textualist” as a buzzword for “Conservatism” in the selection of Donald 
Trump’s judicial nominees.82  Big “C” Conservatives sell the idea of 
“textualism” as a means of limiting judicial activism.83  Many of the most 
recent Conservative members of the Supreme Court — Scalia, Thomas, 
Alito, Gorsuch, and at times Kavanaugh — have adhered to the idea of 
textualism.84  Some scholars have speculated that Conservative judges 
have used the inherently narrowing nature of textualism as a means to 
prevent Congress from achieving its underlying goals.85  In this sense, 
textualism would appear to be Conservative with a “C”: a doctrine to be 
applied to keep the liberal congressional agenda at bay. 
The term “conservative,” however, may have different meanings.  
There is a second argument to be made that textualism is a conservative 
doctrine, but this argument paints textualism as small “c” conservative.  
Here, conservative could be defined not as a political ideology, but 
rather using its dictionary definition: (1) preservative; (2) moderate, 
cautious.86  Small “c” conservative textualism preserves a statute (or 
constitutional clause) by limiting its reading to the text alone.  As Justice 
Gorsuch has described it, “Textualism honors only what’s survived 
bicameralism and presentment- and not what hasn’t.  The text of the 
statute and only the text becomes law.”87  In this way, small “c” 
textualism narrowly confines judges; their political preferences and 
 
(2016) (book review); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’	 Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 
(1983). 
	 82	 See Jimmy Hoover, Bold	New	Bench:	How	Trump’s	Judges	are	Changing	the	Law, 
Law360, (Sept. 10, 2019) https://www.law360.com/articles/1196504/how-trump-s-
judges-are-changing-the-law.  
	 83	 See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 63-64. 
	 84	 See supra note 81.  See also Nancie Marzulla, The	Textualism	of	Clarence	Thomas:	
Anchoring	the	Supreme	Court’s	Property	Rights	Jurisprudence	to	the	Constitution, 10 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC’L POL’Y & L. 351 (2002). 
 85 Scott A. Moss, Judges’	Varied	Views	on	Textualism:	The	Roberts‐Alito	Schism	and	the	
Similar	 District	 Judge	 Divergence	 That	 Undercuts	 the	 Widely	 Assumed	 Textualism‐
Ideology	Correlation, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 22 (2017) (citing Glen Staszewski, Textualism	
and	the	Executive	Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 183 n.178 (2009)).  See	also Simon 
Lazarus, Stripping	 the	 Gears	 of	National	 Government:	 Justice	 Stevens’s	 Stand	 Against	
Judicial	 Subversion	 of	 Progressive	 Laws	 and	 Lawmaking, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 769, 786 
(2012) (“[I]n the great majority of cases in which the challenge is to choose among 
plausible alternative interpretations of nondefinitive statutory words, . . . the practical 
effect of the rigidities of contemporary conservatives’ textualist doctrine is to deny 
judges the most commonsense options for resolving ambiguities—thoughtful analysis 
of reliable indicia of purpose and legislative history materials generally.”). 
	 86	 Conservatism, THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 154 (2004) (There is an 
additional definition, “disposed to maintain existing views, conditions, or institutions,” 
which perhaps better defines big “C” Conservatism.). 
 87 GORSUCH, supra note 81, at 132. 
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ideals about the intent of a statute must be thrust aside in favor of the 
text.  Sometimes the result is an outcome that big “C” Conservatives 
oppose. 
The Slaughter‐House	Cases88 represent one example of the small “c” 
conservative nature of textualism actually expanding the coverage of a 
statute.89  In that case, Justice Miller wrote: 
 
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this 
protection [of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments]. Both 
the language and spirit of these articles are to have their fair 
and just weight in any question of construction. Undoubtedly 
while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress 
which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other 
kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the 
Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the 
Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment 
may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are 
assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall 
within the protection of these articles, that protection will 
apply, though the party interested may not be of African 
descent.90 
 
This is an example of the Supreme Court interpreting “every person” to 
mean “every person” and in the process extending the coverage of three 
Constitutional amendments beyond their intended beneficiaries. 
A more recent example is Bostock	v.	Clayton	County,	Georgia.91  This 
case featured the interpretation of a statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
rather than the Constitution, but textualism still played a role in 
expanding coverage.92  In Bostock, each of the plaintiffs had been fired 
for being gay or transgender.93  In turn, each had brought suit under 
Title VII alleging sex-based discrimination.94  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Gorsuch—one of those big “C” Conservatives — wrote: 
 
 88 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
	 89	 Id. 
	 90	 Id. at 72. 
 91 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020). 
	 92	 Id.at 1743 (“At bottom, these cases involve no more than the straightforward 
application of legal terms with plain and settled meanings.  For an employer to 
discriminate against employees for being homosexual or transgender, the employer 
must intentionally discriminate against individual men and women in part because of 
sex.  That has always been prohibited by Title VII’s plain terms—and that ‘should be the 
end of the analysis.’”) (internal citations omitted)).  
	 93	 Id. at 1737-38. 
	 94	 Id. at 1738 (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1)). 
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Discrimination sometimes involves “the act, practice, or an 
instance of discriminating categorically rather than 
individually.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 326 
(1975); see also post, at –––– – ––––, n. 22 (ALITO, J., 
dissenting). On that understanding, the statute would require 
us to consider the employer’s treatment of groups rather than 
individuals, to see how a policy affects one sex as a whole 
versus the other as a whole. That idea holds some intuitive 
appeal too. Maybe the law concerns itself simply with 
ensuring that employers don’t treat women generally less 
favorably than they do men. So how can we tell which sense, 
individual or group, “discriminate” carries in Title VII? 
 
The statute answers that question directly. It tells us three 
times—including immediately after the words “discriminate 
against”—that our focus should be on individuals, not groups: 
Employers may not “fail or refuse to hire or . . . discharge any 
individual, or otherwise . . . discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 
§ 2000e–2(a)(1) (emphasis added). And the meaning of 
“individual” was as uncontroversial in 1964 as it is today: “A 
particular being as distinguished from a class, species, or 
collection.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, at 1267. 
Here, again, Congress could have written the law differently. 
It might have said that “it shall be an unlawful employment 
practice to prefer one sex to the other in hiring, firing, or the 
terms or conditions of employment.” It might have said that 
there should be no “sex discrimination,” perhaps implying a 
focus on differential treatment between the two sexes as 
groups. More narrowly still, it could have forbidden only 
“sexist policies” against women as a class. But, once again, that 
is not the law we have.95 
 
In making this finding, Gorsuch’s adherence to the plain language of the 
text enabled the individual employees to seek, and receive, 
recompense.96 
It should be clear that narrow readings of operative words or 
phrases do not necessarily lead to outcomes consistent with the policy 
goals of political Conservatives.  Even those big “C” Conservative judges, 
 
	 95	 Id. at 1740-41. 
	 96	 Id.	at 1741-43.	
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when applying textualism in a non-ideological manner, reach 
conclusions that may be considered progressive.  It may be the case 
then, that textualism is often classified as a big “C” Conservative doctrine 
not because of the outcomes it generates, but rather because its most 
vocal proponents are political and ideological Conservatives.97 
An additional, often undiscussed, fact that supports the idea of 
small “c” conservative textualism has to do with the use of textualism by 
the various states themselves.  As Professor Linda Jellum points out, 
while the Congress of the United States has not adopted statutes 
detailing how courts should interpret statutes, some state legislatures 
have.98  This includes states across the political spectrum.99 
In sum, there is evidence to support the claim that textualism is a 
big “C” Conservative doctrine.  At the same time, however, there is 
evidence from the courts and the state legislatures that textualism is 
more of a small “c” conservative doctrine.  If textualism is indeed a small 
“c” conservative doctrine, occupied entirely with judicial restraint 
rather than support for a political agenda, then it is possible that 




If textualism is an approach that is more accurately described as 
small “c” conservative than big “C” conservative, how is it an effective 
tool for Progressives?  Progressive can be defined as “one believing in 
moderate political change and especially social improvement by 
governmental action,”100 although some might argue that political 
Progressives are anything but “moderate.”  It may seem counterintuitive 
that a doctrine which is “preservative” and “moderate or cautious” may 
be useful in pursuing Progressive goals, but the reality is that textualism 
has played a role in advancing Progressive goals and has a role to play 
in the future. 
 
	 97	 See Paul Killebrew, Where	are	all	the	Left‐Wing	Textualists?, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1852, 
1900 (2007). 
 98 LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 33 (2013). 
	 99	 See	e.g., Conn.Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-2z; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-203; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-15; Iowa Code Ann. § 4.6; N.D. Cent. Code § 1-02-39; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1.49; 1 
Pa. ons. Stat. § 1921(b). 
	 100	 Progressive,	THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 154 (2004). 
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A. PAST EXAMPLES OF TEXTUALISM HELPING A PROGRESSIVE AGENDA 
One Progressive victory in which textualism played a major role 
was King v. Burwell,101 the famous Obamacare case, authored by a big 
“C” Conservative Supreme Court Justice who would not readily be 
identified as a textualist. 102  In King, the plaintiff challenged Section 36B 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act questioning whether 
the Act’s tax credits are available in States that have a Federal 
Exchange.103  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts quietly 
affirmed the Supreme Court’s commitment to textualism, saying “[i]f the 
statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.”104  
Roberts also stated that when deciding whether the language is plain, 
the court must look at the words both in their context and at their place 
within the statutory scheme.105  
Finding the text of the Act to be ambiguous, Roberts turned to the 
structure of the Act for clarity, arguing that “[a] provision that may seem 
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the 
statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings 
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the 
law.”106  The language used by Roberts is a rephrasing of one of the most 
important canons of construction relied on by textualists: the whole-
text canon.  The whole-text canon calls on the interpreter to consider 
the entirety of the text in light of its structure and the “physical and 
logical relation of its many parts.”107 
In the end, Roberts’ reliance on the whole-text cannon resulted in 
a finding that “Section 36B allows tax credits for insurance purchased 
on any Exchange created under the Act.”108  Textualism delivered a big 
win for Progressives in a case that could have easily swung the other 
way based on the ideology of the Supreme Court’s members.  While King 
is certainly not the only case in which textualism led to an outcome 
favored by Progressives, it is, along with Bostock, one of the most high 
profile. 
 
 101 King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, (2015). 
	 102	 Id. 
	 103	 Id. at 478. 
	 104	 Id.	at 486 (citing Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010)). 
	 105	 Id. 
	 106	 Id.	at 492 (citing United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)). 
 107 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 52, at 167. 
	 108	 King, 576 U.S. at 498. 
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B. FUTURE AREAS WHERE TEXTUALISM CAN SUPPORT PROGRESSIVE 
Some areas where Progressive attorneys and judges should be 
looking to apply textualism are obvious: commonsense gun laws, voting 
access, and qualified immunity.  While there are other areas in which 
textualism can be applied towards progressive ends, these three are 
hot-button issues at the moment.  This Article considers gun reform and 
qualified immunity in closer detail. 
i. Commonsense	Gun	Reform	
Various states’ ability to pass commonsense gun control legislation 
was dealt a severe blow when the United States Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in District	 of	 Columbia	 v.	 Heller.109  Scholar Cass 
Sunstein has described Heller as “the most explicitly and self-
consciously originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme Court.”110  
The majority opinion —  authored by arch-textualist, Big “C” 
Conservative Justice Scalia — certainly deserves that reputation; but 
how does it hold up under a text-based analysis? 
 The text of the Second Amendment is well known: “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”111  The 
District of Columbia had, in practice, banned the possession of 
handguns; the carrying of an unregistered firearm had been outlawed, 
but it was not possible to register a handgun.112  Richard Heller was a 
police officer who applied for, and was denied, a registration certificate 
for a handgun that he wished to keep in his home.113 
At the very outset of the case, Justice Scalia rejected the idea that 
the phrase “[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State,” had any value.114  He then proceeded to an “analysis” of the 
text by breaking it up in to two smaller clauses: (1) “the right of the 
people” and (2) “keep and bear arms.” 115  In defining “the right of the 
people,” Justice Scalia—without the support of any precedent—
appeared to find an implied individual right, rather than a right inherent 
to a class of individuals.116  In interpreting the phrase “keep and bear 
 
 109 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 110 Cass Sunstein, Second	Amendment	Minimalism:	Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 246, 246 (2008). 
 111 U.S. CONST. amend. 2. 
	 112	 Heller, 554 U.S. at 574-75. 
	 113	 Id. at 575. 
	 114	 Id. at 578. 
	 115	 Id. at 579-92. 
	 116	 Id. at 579-81. 
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arms,” Justice Scalia turned to dictionaries in order to reach a 
definition—which is admittedly a fair definition—but then he proceeds 
to argue that the phrase “keep and bear arms” does not relate to military 
service.117  
Textualism—indeed Justice Scalia’s own textualism—necessarily 
leads to a different interpretive outcome.  Indeed, in trying to reach a 
Conservative-friendly outcome, Justice Scalia abandoned many of the 
rules of interpretation that he would later, with the assistance of Bryan 
Garner, slap together in a book and make available to the public for 
purchase.118  A textualist reading of the Second Amendment should have 
proceeded differently. 
A court addressing a challenge based on the Second Amendment 
should proceed with the understanding that the text of the law is the 
law.119  There are no outside sources—whether dictionaries, memoirs, 
or legislative history—that alter the meaning of the text.  If the text is 
unambiguous, the court should simply stop with the text. 
But suppose that the text of the Second Amendment was found to 
be ambiguous; what then?  Here the canons of construction come into 
play.  First, a court might consider the prefatory-materials canon.  This 
canon acknowledges that a prefatory clause sets forth “the assumed 
facts and the purposes that the majority of the enacting legislature . . . 
had in mind, and these can shed light on the operative provisions that 
follow.”120  Alternatively, Justice Joseph Story wrote that “the preamble 
of a statute is a key to open the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs, 
which are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be accomplished 
by the provisions of the statute.”121  Scalia’s outcome in Heller was 
dependent upon rejecting the prefatory-materials canon, because if the 
right to keep and bear arms is related to militia service, the argument 
for an implied individual right evaporates. 
Even if Justice Scalia were correct in eschewing the prefatory-
materials canon, he should still have had to contend with the whole-text 
canon.  As Scalia and Garner wrote, when the whole-text canon is 
properly applied, “it typically establishes that only one of the possible 
meanings that a word or phrase can bear is compatible with the use of 
the same word or phrase elsewhere in the statute….”122  This makes it 
 
	 117	 Id. at 581-92. 
	 118	 See	generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 52. 
 119 Kavanaugh, supra note 12, at 2118. 
 120 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 52, at 218. 
 121 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §459, at	
326 (2d ed. 1858). 
 122 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 52, at 168. 
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difficult to establish “the people” as referencing individuals rather than 
as referencing a class, especially considering that the Supreme Court has 
written that: 
 
 “[T]he people” seems to have been a term of art employed in 
select parts of the Constitution . . . . [Its uses] suggest[] that 
“the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the 
First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and 
powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, 
refers to a class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.123  
 
Scalia, of course referenced this very case (in which he was in the 
majority) in Heller, before claiming that this reading of “the people” was 
inconsistent with the meaning of “militia”.124 
Scalia also ignored the negative-implication canon, which states 
that “the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others” 
(expression unius est exclusion alterius).125  As Scalia and Garner wrote, 
“[c]ontext establishes the conditions for applying the canon, but where 
those conditions exist, the principle that specification of the one implies 
exclusion of the other validly describes how people express themselves 
and understand verbal expression.”126  Because the Second 
Amendment’s prefatory material includes a reference to the militia, but 
the entire amendment is silent about a private right to own firearms—
whether for self-defense or any other reason—it is reasonable to 
conclude that the Second Amendment does not provide an individual 
right to gun ownership.  
While Heller currently stands as a roadblock to commonsense gun 
reform, it will be challenged in the courts.  When called to account, 
Heller’s reasoning is visibly contrived and partisan.  Textualism provides 
an argument rooted in the text of the Second Amendment, and drawing 
upon accepted principles of interpretation, that inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that the Second Amendment does not provide a private right 
to gun ownership.  That is not to say that there is no Constitutional right 
to own a gun (maybe it is one of those enigmatic Ninth Amendment 
rights), only that such a right does not reside in the Second Amendment.  
 
 123 United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). 
	 124	 Heller, 554 U.S. at 580.  
 125 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 52, at 107. 
 126 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 52, at 107. 
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If the Second Amendment does not provide such a right, then the Second 
Amendment cannot restrict regulations on private gun ownership. 
ii. Qualified	Immunity	
Following a disturbing number of high-profile police killings, the 
issue of qualified immunity has become a recent hot-topic of 
conversation.  Federal law provides a means for bringing suit against 
government officials who have deprived an individual of their rights: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action 
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken 
in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be 
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this 
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia.127 
 
Qualified immunity, however, protects government officials “from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known[,]” thereby precluding suit in the 
first place.128 
The United States Supreme Court has embraced qualified 
immunity as a doctrine that offers protection for “all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”129  The Court has 
described its purpose as: 
 
The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free 
officials from the concerns of litigation, including “avoidance 
of disruptive discovery.” There are serious and legitimate 
reasons for this. If a Government official is to devote time to 
 
 127 Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2020). 
 128 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 129 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
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his or her duties, and to the formulation of sound and 
responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require the 
substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in 
litigation and making informed decisions as to how it should 
proceed. Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials 
comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency 
and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might 
otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of 
the Government.130  
 
An extensive study by Joanna Schwarz shows a lack of evidence 
supporting the Supreme Court’s reasoning.131 
Regardless of the purposes the Supreme Court may envision 
qualified immunity serving, an analysis of the text of §1983 supports 
dismantling the doctrine of qualified immunity.  The statute is clear 
about who is liable, and under what circumstances that liability 
arises.132  It is undisputed that police officers fall within the purview of 
§ 1983.  The statute also carves out a single exception for judicial 
officers’ actions or omissions taken in a judicial capacity, where 
injunctive relief cannot be granted unless a declaratory decree were 
violated, or if declaratory relief was unavailable .133 
There does not appear to be an ambiguity in the text of § 1983, and 
so it should be applied as written.  After all, a statute’s “purpose must be 
derived from the text.”134  This leaves no place for qualified immunity 
within the law related to § 1983.  But what if a court were to find that 
§1983 was ambiguous?  Would qualified immunity be justifiable if such 
a finding were made? 
The statute does not include any exemptions outside of judicial 
officers.  Nor does § 1983—or, for that matter, any related section—
include any affirmative defenses.  The negative-implication canon, 
which states that the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of 
others, would lead to the conclusion that expression of an exception for 
judicial officers means that law enforcement officers were excluded 
intentionally from extra protection.135  Even if the text of § 1983 were 
 
 130 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (quoting	Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 
236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 
	 131	 See	generally Joanna C. Schwarz, How	Qualified	Immunity	Fails, 127 YALE L. J. 2, 12 
(2017). 
 132 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
	 133	 Id. 
 134 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 52, at 56. 
 135 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 52, at 56. 
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ambiguous, qualified immunity is incompatible with § 1983 because 
explicit exceptions exist within the text. 
 
V.	CONCLUSION	
Textualism has long enjoyed a reputation as a doctrine used by 
politically Conservative judges to reach politically Conservative 
outcomes.  It is certainly true that many of textualism’s greatest 
advocates and scholars have been politically Conservative jurists such 
as Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook.  At the same time, as a doctrine 
of Constitutional and statutory interpretation textualism opens doors 
for Progressive lawyers and jurists to attack court-created doctrines 
that are inconsistent with the text of the law.  While this Article names 
several areas in which textualism is a valuable tool for Progressives—
gun control, qualified immunity, and voting rights—the list of areas 
where textualist-leaning Progressives could reshape law includes 
several vital fields: immigration, health care, criminal justice reform, 
campaign finance.  If textualism can help Progressives reshape the law, 
why not adopt it? 
 
